The 9/11 Commission
After delaying for over a year
the formation of a special commission to investigate the attacks,
President Bush finally yielded to pressure from families of the victims
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
which is also known as the 9/11 Commission or Kean Commission.
The Commission produced the
9/11 Commission Report,
which is the subject of the book
The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions
by David Griffin.
The report begins with the following description of itself:
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The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(also known as the 9-11 Commission), an
commission created by congressional legislation and the signature of
President George W. Bush
in late 2002,
is chartered to prepare a
full and complete account
of the circumstances surrounding the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
including preparedness for and the
immediate response to the attacks.
The Commission is also mandated to provide recommendations
designed to guard against future attacks.
While the Commission's self-characterization as "bi-partisan"
is disingenuous given the wholesale cooperation of
Democrats and Republicans alike in the
its use of "independent" is a bold-face lie,
unless it was meant to describe the Commission's independence from the truth.
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The 9/11 Report
The 9/11 Commission Report: An Elaborate Fiction
On July 22, 2004, the
"National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States"
also known as the "9/11 Commission,"
published its final Report, the
"9/11 Commission Report".
The Report became a best-seller and was hailed in the
corporate media as the definitive Report on the attacks.
However, the Report is more accurately characterized as the
definitive narrative of the official myth of 9/11.
As David Ray Griffin points out in his scholarly book,
The 9/11 Commission Report; Omissions and Distortions,
the Report systematically excludes almost every fact that
doesn't support the official story.
Omissions and Distortions
Most of what we document on this website has been omitted
from the Commission Report, particularly the contents of the
Indeed, the omissions are so numerous they could fill a book,
and do --
David Griffin's 339-page Omissions and Distortions.
Here we list only some of the more egregious
in the Report.
The 911Research page goes on to list dozens of egregious
omissions and distortions in the report,
most of which were earlier documented in Griffin's book.
One of the more interesting omissions in the huge report
is its failure to so much as mention the total collapse of the
47-story steel-framed skyscraper
to the north of the World Trade Center complex,
the first-ever collapse of a steel-framed high-rise building
to be blamed on fires.
One of the more interesting distortions of the report
is its sole structural description of the Twin Towers:
the outside of each tower was covered by a frame of 14-inch-wide
steel columns; the centers of the steel columns were 40 inches apart.
These exterior walls bore most of the weight of the building.
The interior core of the buildings was a hollow steel shaft,
in which elevators and stairwells were grouped.
In this construction photo, the tower's core structure
dominates the left half of the image.
The commission described it as a
"hollow steel shaft".
(Click image to enlarge.)
The following excerpt from an e-mail message by 9/11 Truth activist
provides some interesting details on the conduct of the Commission:
- The Kean Commission (9/11 Commission) was created only after 14 months of
pressure from September 11 victims' families, who for their efforts at first
got the failed nomination by George Bush of Henry Kissinger as chairman. He
declined, but the Commission consisted of appointees with obvious conflicts of
interest, and was seriously underfunded ($14 million as opposed to the $67
million devoted to investigating Clinton's stray member or $30 million for
the space shuttle disaster).
Its work was met with resistance from the White House. Bush met
with the Commission only on the condition that he be questioned in the Oval
Office, jointly with Cheney, and off the record.
(See "A Brief History of the Kean Commission,"
- The majority of the nearly 400 questions submitted for investigation to the
Kean Commission by the September 11 victims' families who lobbied the inquiry
into existence (the Family Steering Committee) were not even addressed in The
9/11 Commission Report. (See
- The executive director and thus head of research for the Kean Commission,
Philip Zelikow, is a close associate of Condoleezza Rice
(they co-authored a book)
and was a Bush 2000 transition team member who participated in meetings on the
terrorist threat. He has now returned to Rice as a top aide at the State
Department. The Family Steering Committee tracking the hearings called for his
resignation due to grave conflict of interest in March 2004;
this unfortunately went
unreported in the major media and was completely ignored by the Commission.
- Kean Commission member Max Cleland dropped out of the proceedings in
saying "Bush is scamming America" and that he didn't want to participate
in a cover-up by the Commission of what the government knew about 9/11 in
advance. (Off the record he has since said the Bush administration knew the
attacks were coming.) This also got near-zero press coverage.
- The report of the Commission does not even bother with redactions, or a
summary of its own omissions. Unlike all other government reports relating to
national security issues, we do not even have an idea of how much was left out.
- At the end of October, 2004, a firefighter with
the New York Fire Department as well as a Ground Zero recovery worker
came forward to claim that the three of the four "black boxes" from
the aircraft at Ground Zero were found during the clean-up work
(Philadelphia Daily News, 10/28/04), contrary to the government's
longstanding assertion that no trace of these devices was ever discovered,
which assertion was reiterated in The 9/11 Commission Report
(Ch. 1, fn. 76, p. 468).
- The Commission's determination of the time of the UA 93 crash in
(10:03 am) requires us to believe that by coincidence, a separate
natural seismic event in the area three minutes later caused a tremor
of a magnitude similar to that of a plane crash.
- The 9/11 Commission Report goes so far as to suggest that the issue
of terror financing is irrelevant:
"To date, the U.S. government has not been able to
determine the origin of the money used for the 9/11 attacks. Ultimately the
question is of little practical significance." (p. 172)
Mainstream Criticism of the Commission
The Commission report has also been vigorously attacked by writers who
have apparently not examined the evidence that the attack was an inside job.
In a cover article in Harpers
Benjamin DeMott blasted the report as a whitewash.
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The plain, sad reality--I report this following four full days
studying the work--is that The 9/11 Commission Report,
despite the vast quantity of labor behind it, is a cheat and a fraud.
It stands as a series of evasive maneuvers that infantilize the audience,
transform candor into iniquity, and conceal realities that demand immediate
inspection and confrontation. Because it is continuously engaged in scotching
all attempts to distinguish better from worse leadership responses,
can't discharge its duty to educate the audience about the habits of mind
and temperament essential in those chosen to discharge command responsibility
during crises. It can't tell the truth about what was done and not done,
thought and not thought, at crucial turning points. The Commissioners'
immeasurably valuable access to the principals involved offered
an extraordinary opportunity to amass material precious to future historians:
commentary based on moment-to-moment reaction to major events.
But the 567 pages, which purport to provide definitive interpretations of the
reactions, are in fact useless to historians, because a seeming terror of bias
transforms query after
commissarial query--and silence after silence--into
suggested new lines of self-justification for the interviewees. In the course
of blaming everybody a little, the Commission blames nobody--blurs
the reasons for the actions and hesitations of successive administrations,
masks choices that, fearlessly defined, might actually have vitalized our
public political discourse.
Given the numerous lies and contradictions not mentioned by DeMott,
we might describe his piece as
praising the Report with faint condemnation.
page last modified: 2006-08-18